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✅ Article highlight: *Adversarial SI* (art-60-050, v0.1)
TL;DR:
If SI-Core is meant for real deployment, it cannot assume benevolent actors. This article looks at *adversarial SI*: malicious Jumps, malicious RML calls, poisoned Genius Traces, metric gaming, compromised peers, and policy-plane artifacts as attack surfaces.
The core claim is simple: *OBS / ID / MEM / ETH / EVAL / PoLB are not just governance layers — they are also a defensive fabric.*
Read:
kanaria007/agi-structural-intelligence-protocols
Why it matters:
• treats SI-Core invariants as security invariants, not just safety abstractions
• makes abuse structurally expensive through traceability, fail-closed ETH, and scoped capabilities
• reuses *SCover / SCI / CAS* as security and forensics signals
• treats red-teaming as structured experimentation, not ad hoc chaos
What’s inside:
• an SI-native threat taxonomy: malicious Jumps, RML abuse, peer spoofing, metric gaming, policy-plane tampering
• defensive uses of *ID / OBS / MEM / ETH / EVAL / PoLB*
• malicious Genius Traces and how to vet or quarantine them
• *incident response as an SIR-native process*
• federated trust, revocation, quarantine, and graceful degradation
• red-team EvalSurfaces and abuse-resistant PoLB recipes
Key idea:
The goal is not invincibility. It is to make abuse *hard to execute, easy to detect, and easy to learn from* using the same structural language as the rest of SI-Core.
TL;DR:
If SI-Core is meant for real deployment, it cannot assume benevolent actors. This article looks at *adversarial SI*: malicious Jumps, malicious RML calls, poisoned Genius Traces, metric gaming, compromised peers, and policy-plane artifacts as attack surfaces.
The core claim is simple: *OBS / ID / MEM / ETH / EVAL / PoLB are not just governance layers — they are also a defensive fabric.*
Read:
kanaria007/agi-structural-intelligence-protocols
Why it matters:
• treats SI-Core invariants as security invariants, not just safety abstractions
• makes abuse structurally expensive through traceability, fail-closed ETH, and scoped capabilities
• reuses *SCover / SCI / CAS* as security and forensics signals
• treats red-teaming as structured experimentation, not ad hoc chaos
What’s inside:
• an SI-native threat taxonomy: malicious Jumps, RML abuse, peer spoofing, metric gaming, policy-plane tampering
• defensive uses of *ID / OBS / MEM / ETH / EVAL / PoLB*
• malicious Genius Traces and how to vet or quarantine them
• *incident response as an SIR-native process*
• federated trust, revocation, quarantine, and graceful degradation
• red-team EvalSurfaces and abuse-resistant PoLB recipes
Key idea:
The goal is not invincibility. It is to make abuse *hard to execute, easy to detect, and easy to learn from* using the same structural language as the rest of SI-Core.
