Daily Papers

Recent advances in multi-agent systems have shown great potential for solving complex tasks. However, when multiple agents edit a shared codebase concurrently, their changes can silently conflict and inconsistent views lead to integration failures. Existing multi-agent systems address this through workspace isolation (e.g., one git worktree per agent), but this defers conflict resolution to a post-hoc merge step where recovery is expensive. In this paper, we propose STORM, i.e., STate-ORiented Management for multi-agent collaboration. Specifically, STORM manages agent states by mediating their interactions with the shared workspace, ensuring that each agent operates on a consistent view of the codebase and that conflicting edits are detected and resolved at write time. We evaluate STORM on Commit0 and PaperBench across multiple LLMs. STORM outperforms the git-worktree-based multi-agent baseline by +18.7 on Commit0-Lite and +1.4 on PaperBench, while achieving comparable or better cost efficiency. Combined with single-agent runs, STORM reaches highest scores of 87.6 and 78.2 on the two benchmarks respectively, suggesting that explicit state management is a more effective foundation for multi-agent collaboration than workspace isolation. STORM can also be plugged into any multi-agent system seamlessly.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

Large language models (LLMs) extended as systems, such as ChatGPT, have begun supporting third-party applications. These LLM apps leverage the de facto natural language-based automated execution paradigm of LLMs: that is, apps and their interactions are defined in natural language, provided access to user data, and allowed to freely interact with each other and the system. These LLM app ecosystems resemble the settings of earlier computing platforms, where there was insufficient isolation between apps and the system. Because third-party apps may not be trustworthy, and exacerbated by the imprecision of natural language interfaces, the current designs pose security and privacy risks for users. In this paper, we evaluate whether these issues can be addressed through execution isolation and what that isolation might look like in the context of LLM-based systems, where there are arbitrary natural language-based interactions between system components, between LLM and apps, and between apps. To that end, we propose IsolateGPT, a design architecture that demonstrates the feasibility of execution isolation and provides a blueprint for implementing isolation, in LLM-based systems. We evaluate IsolateGPT against a number of attacks and demonstrate that it protects against many security, privacy, and safety issues that exist in non-isolated LLM-based systems, without any loss of functionality. The performance overhead incurred by IsolateGPT to improve security is under 30% for three-quarters of tested queries.

Workspace learning requires AI agents to identify, reason over, exploit, and update explicit and implicit dependencies among heterogeneous files in a worker's workspace, enabling them to complete both routine and advanced tasks effectively. Despite its importance, existing relevant benchmarks largely evaluate agents on pre-specified or synthesized files with limited real-world dependencies, leaving workspace-level evaluation underexplored. To this end, we introduce Workspace-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating AI agents on Workspace Learning invOlving Large-Scale File Dependencies. We construct realistic workspaces with 5 worker profiles, 74 file types, 20,476 files (up to 20GB) and curate 388 tasks, each with its own file dependency graph, evaluated across 7,399 total rubrics that require cross-file retrieval, contextual reasoning, and adaptive decision-making. We further provide Workspace-Bench-Lite, a 100-task subset that preserves the benchmark distribution while reducing evaluation costs by about 70%. We evaluate 4 popular agent harnesses and 7 foundation models. Experimental results show that current agents remain far from reliable workspace learning, where the best reaches only 68.7%, substantially below the human result of 80.7%, and the average performance across agents is only 47.4%.

Recent advances in persistent personal-agent frameworks are making human-centered agent networks realistic deployment targets: each user can be served by an AI agent that acts on the user's behalf, maintains state, and communicates with other agents through social and task relations. In these networks, everyday tool use becomes multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces, where files, records, tools, and policies are not directly visible across owners. Existing agent benchmarks study tool use and collaboration, but they do not provide an end-to-end sandbox for verifiable cross-user agent collaboration with realistic user digital workspaces or test how harmful actions can travel through the human-centered agent network. We introduce WeClawArena, an auditable benchmark and runtime sandbox for multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces. WeClawArena targets collaborative tool-use tasks in which personal workspaces serve as both operational tools and personal constraints. The benchmark contains 124 base tasks across six cross-user task domains and expands them into 620 scenario variants, with one benign control and four attack-vector variants per base task. The sandbox records peer messages, tool calls, resource operations, governed decisions, and final workspace states. WeClawArena reports utility and attack success rate separately and audits attack success from bounded runtime evidence, supporting diagnosis of task breakdown, privacy leakage, poisoned evidence, and invalid authority paths.