Daily Papers

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Dense embedding-based text retrievalx2013retrieval of relevant passages from corpora via deep learning encodingsx2013has emerged as a powerful method attaining state-of-the-art search results and popularizing the use of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). Still, like other search methods, embedding-based retrieval may be susceptible to search-engine optimization (SEO) attacks, where adversaries promote malicious content by introducing adversarial passages to corpora. To faithfully assess and gain insights into the susceptibility of such systems to SEO, this work proposes the GASLITE attack, a mathematically principled gradient-based search method for generating adversarial passages without relying on the corpus content or modifying the model. Notably, GASLITE's passages (1) carry adversary-chosen information while (2) achieving high retrieval ranking for a selected query distribution when inserted to corpora. We use GASLITE to extensively evaluate retrievers' robustness, testing nine advanced models under varied threat models, while focusing on realistic adversaries targeting queries on a specific concept (e.g., a public figure). We found GASLITE consistently outperformed baselines by geq140% success rate, in all settings. Particularly, adversaries using GASLITE require minimal effort to manipulate search resultsx2013by injecting a negligible amount of adversarial passages (leq0.0001% of the corpus), they could make them visible in the top-10 results for 61-100% of unseen concept-specific queries against most evaluated models. Inspecting variance in retrievers' robustness, we identify key factors that may contribute to models' susceptibility to SEO, including specific properties in the embedding space's geometry.

With the increasing size of frontier LLMs, post-training quantization has become the standard for memory-efficient deployment. Recent work has shown that basic rounding-based quantization schemes pose security risks, as they can be exploited to inject malicious behaviors into quantized models that remain hidden in full precision. However, existing attacks cannot be applied to more complex quantization methods, such as the GGUF family used in the popular ollama and llama.cpp frameworks. In this work, we address this gap by introducing the first attack on GGUF. Our key insight is that the quantization error -- the difference between the full-precision weights and their (de-)quantized version -- provides sufficient flexibility to construct malicious quantized models that appear benign in full precision. Leveraging this, we develop an attack that trains the target malicious LLM while constraining its weights based on quantization errors. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on three popular LLMs across nine GGUF quantization data types on three diverse attack scenarios: insecure code generation (Delta=88.7%), targeted content injection (Delta=85.0%), and benign instruction refusal (Delta=30.1%). Our attack highlights that (1) the most widely used post-training quantization method is susceptible to adversarial interferences, and (2) the complexity of quantization schemes alone is insufficient as a defense.

Quantization leverages lower-precision weights to reduce the memory usage of large language models (LLMs) and is a key technique for enabling their deployment on commodity hardware. While LLM quantization's impact on utility has been extensively explored, this work for the first time studies its adverse effects from a security perspective. We reveal that widely used quantization methods can be exploited to produce a harmful quantized LLM, even though the full-precision counterpart appears benign, potentially tricking users into deploying the malicious quantized model. We demonstrate this threat using a three-staged attack framework: (i) first, we obtain a malicious LLM through fine-tuning on an adversarial task; (ii) next, we quantize the malicious model and calculate constraints that characterize all full-precision models that map to the same quantized model; (iii) finally, using projected gradient descent, we tune out the poisoned behavior from the full-precision model while ensuring that its weights satisfy the constraints computed in step (ii). This procedure results in an LLM that exhibits benign behavior in full precision but when quantized, it follows the adversarial behavior injected in step (i). We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility and severity of such an attack across three diverse scenarios: vulnerable code generation, content injection, and over-refusal attack. In practice, the adversary could host the resulting full-precision model on an LLM community hub such as Hugging Face, exposing millions of users to the threat of deploying its malicious quantized version on their devices.

The emergence of Diffusion Transformers (DiT) has brought significant advancements to video generation, especially in text-to-video and image-to-video tasks. Although video generation is widely applied in various fields, most existing models are limited to single scenarios and cannot perform diverse video generation and editing through dynamic content manipulation. We propose OmniV2V, a video model capable of generating and editing videos across different scenarios based on various operations, including: object movement, object addition, mask-guided video edit, try-on, inpainting, outpainting, human animation, and controllable character video synthesis. We explore a unified dynamic content manipulation injection module, which effectively integrates the requirements of the above tasks. In addition, we design a visual-text instruction module based on LLaVA, enabling the model to effectively understand the correspondence between visual content and instructions. Furthermore, we build a comprehensive multi-task data processing system. Since there is data overlap among various tasks, this system can efficiently provide data augmentation. Using this system, we construct a multi-type, multi-scenario OmniV2V dataset and its corresponding OmniV2V-Test benchmark. Extensive experiments show that OmniV2V works as well as, and sometimes better than, the best existing open-source and commercial models for many video generation and editing tasks.

Despite the impressive generative capabilities of diffusion models, existing diffusion model-based style transfer methods require inference-stage optimization (e.g. fine-tuning or textual inversion of style) which is time-consuming, or fails to leverage the generative ability of large-scale diffusion models. To address these issues, we introduce a novel artistic style transfer method based on a pre-trained large-scale diffusion model without any optimization. Specifically, we manipulate the features of self-attention layers as the way the cross-attention mechanism works; in the generation process, substituting the key and value of content with those of style image. This approach provides several desirable characteristics for style transfer including 1) preservation of content by transferring similar styles into similar image patches and 2) transfer of style based on similarity of local texture (e.g. edge) between content and style images. Furthermore, we introduce query preservation and attention temperature scaling to mitigate the issue of disruption of original content, and initial latent Adaptive Instance Normalization (AdaIN) to deal with the disharmonious color (failure to transfer the colors of style). Our experimental results demonstrate that our proposed method surpasses state-of-the-art methods in both conventional and diffusion-based style transfer baselines.

Generalist web agents have evolved rapidly and demonstrated remarkable potential. However, there are unprecedented safety risks associated with these them, which are nearly unexplored so far. In this work, we aim to narrow this gap by conducting the first study on the privacy risks of generalist web agents in adversarial environments. First, we present a threat model that discusses the adversarial targets, constraints, and attack scenarios. Particularly, we consider two types of adversarial targets: stealing users' specific personally identifiable information (PII) or stealing the entire user request. To achieve these objectives, we propose a novel attack method, termed Environmental Injection Attack (EIA). This attack injects malicious content designed to adapt well to different environments where the agents operate, causing them to perform unintended actions. This work instantiates EIA specifically for the privacy scenario. It inserts malicious web elements alongside persuasive instructions that mislead web agents into leaking private information, and can further leverage CSS and JavaScript features to remain stealthy. We collect 177 actions steps that involve diverse PII categories on realistic websites from the Mind2Web dataset, and conduct extensive experiments using one of the most capable generalist web agent frameworks to date, SeeAct. The results demonstrate that EIA achieves up to 70% ASR in stealing users' specific PII. Stealing full user requests is more challenging, but a relaxed version of EIA can still achieve 16% ASR. Despite these concerning results, it is important to note that the attack can still be detectable through careful human inspection, highlighting a trade-off between high autonomy and security. This leads to our detailed discussion on the efficacy of EIA under different levels of human supervision as well as implications on defenses for generalist web agents.

Vision language models (VLMs) extend the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to cross-modal settings, yet remain highly vulnerable to multimodal jailbreak attacks. Existing defenses predominantly rely on safety fine-tuning or aggressive token manipulations, incurring substantial training costs or significantly degrading utility. Recent research shows that LLMs inherently recognize unsafe content in text, and the incorporation of visual inputs in VLMs frequently dilutes risk-related signals. Motivated by this, we propose Risk Awareness Injection (RAI), a lightweight and training-free framework for safety calibration that restores LLM-like risk recognition by amplifying unsafe signals in VLMs. Specifically, RAI constructs an Unsafe Prototype Subspace from language embeddings and performs targeted modulation on selected high-risk visual tokens, explicitly activating safety-critical signals within the cross-modal feature space. This modulation restores the model's LLM-like ability to detect unsafe content from visual inputs, while preserving the semantic integrity of original tokens for cross-modal reasoning. Extensive experiments across multiple jailbreak and utility benchmarks demonstrate that RAI substantially reduces attack success rate without compromising task performance.

Recent Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have been challenged by the computational overhead resulting from massive video frames, often alleviated through compression strategies. However, the visual content is not equally contributed to user instructions, existing strategies (\eg, average pool) inevitably lead to the loss of potentially useful information. To tackle this, we propose the Hybrid-level Instruction Injection Strategy for Conditional Token Compression in MLLMs (HICom), utilizing the instruction as a condition to guide the compression from both local and global levels. This encourages the compression to retain the maximum amount of user-focused information while reducing visual tokens to minimize computational burden. Specifically, the instruction condition is injected into the grouped visual tokens at the local level and the learnable tokens at the global level, and we conduct the attention mechanism to complete the conditional compression. From the hybrid-level compression, the instruction-relevant visual parts are highlighted while the temporal-spatial structure is also preserved for easier understanding of LLMs. To further unleash the potential of HICom, we introduce a new conditional pre-training stage with our proposed dataset HICom-248K. Experiments show that our HICom can obtain distinguished video understanding ability with fewer tokens, increasing the performance by 2.43\% average on three multiple-choice QA benchmarks and saving 78.8\% tokens compared with the SOTA method. The code is available at https://github.com/lntzm/HICom.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has brought new vitality to the various domains and generated substantial social and economic benefits. However, the swift advancement of LLMs has introduced new security vulnerabilities. Jailbreak, a form of attack that induces LLMs to output harmful content through carefully crafted prompts, poses a challenge to the safe and trustworthy development of LLMs. Previous jailbreak attack methods primarily exploited the internal capabilities of the model. Among them, one category leverages the model's implicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker is unaware of the exact reasons for the attack's success. The other category utilizes the model's explicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker understands the reasons for the attack's success. For example, these attacks exploit the model's abilities in coding, contextual learning, or understanding ASCII characters. However, these earlier jailbreak attacks have certain limitations, as they only exploit the inherent capabilities of the model. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak method, SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ), which utilizes the construction of input prompts by LLMs to inject jailbreak information into user prompts, enabling successful jailbreak of the LLMs. Our SIJ method achieves nearly 100\% attack success rates on five well-known open-source LLMs in the context of AdvBench, while incurring lower time costs compared to previous methods. More importantly, SIJ reveals a new vulnerability in LLMs that urgently needs to be addressed. To this end, we propose a defense method called Self-Reminder-Key and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak{https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak}.

Style transfer is an inventive process designed to create an image that maintains the essence of the original while embracing the visual style of another. Although diffusion models have demonstrated impressive generative power in personalized subject-driven or style-driven applications, existing state-of-the-art methods still encounter difficulties in achieving a seamless balance between content preservation and style enhancement. For example, amplifying the style's influence can often undermine the structural integrity of the content. To address these challenges, we deconstruct the style transfer task into three core elements: 1) Style, focusing on the image's aesthetic characteristics; 2) Spatial Structure, concerning the geometric arrangement and composition of visual elements; and 3) Semantic Content, which captures the conceptual meaning of the image. Guided by these principles, we introduce InstantStyle-Plus, an approach that prioritizes the integrity of the original content while seamlessly integrating the target style. Specifically, our method accomplishes style injection through an efficient, lightweight process, utilizing the cutting-edge InstantStyle framework. To reinforce the content preservation, we initiate the process with an inverted content latent noise and a versatile plug-and-play tile ControlNet for preserving the original image's intrinsic layout. We also incorporate a global semantic adapter to enhance the semantic content's fidelity. To safeguard against the dilution of style information, a style extractor is employed as discriminator for providing supplementary style guidance. Codes will be available at https://github.com/instantX-research/InstantStyle-Plus.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

Tuning-free long video diffusion has been proposed to generate extended-duration videos with enriched content by reusing the knowledge from pre-trained short video diffusion model without retraining. However, most works overlook the fine-grained long-term video consistency modeling, resulting in limited scene consistency (i.e., unreasonable object or background transitions), especially with multiple text inputs. To mitigate this, we propose the Consistency Noise Injection, dubbed CoNo, which introduces the "look-back" mechanism to enhance the fine-grained scene transition between different video clips, and designs the long-term consistency regularization to eliminate the content shifts when extending video contents through noise prediction. In particular, the "look-back" mechanism breaks the noise scheduling process into three essential parts, where one internal noise prediction part is injected into two video-extending parts, intending to achieve a fine-grained transition between two video clips. The long-term consistency regularization focuses on explicitly minimizing the pixel-wise distance between the predicted noises of the extended video clip and the original one, thereby preventing abrupt scene transitions. Extensive experiments have shown the effectiveness of the above strategies by performing long-video generation under both single- and multi-text prompt conditions. The project has been available in https://wxrui182.github.io/CoNo.github.io/.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Diffusion models have emerged as the leading approach for style transfer, yet they struggle with photo-realistic transfers, often producing painting-like results or missing detailed stylistic elements. Current methods inadequately address unwanted influence from original content styles and style reference content features. We introduce SCAdapter, a novel technique leveraging CLIP image space to effectively separate and integrate content and style features. Our key innovation systematically extracts pure content from content images and style elements from style references, ensuring authentic transfers. This approach is enhanced through three components: Controllable Style Adaptive Instance Normalization (CSAdaIN) for precise multi-style blending, KVS Injection for targeted style integration, and a style transfer consistency objective maintaining process coherence. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate SCAdapter significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both conventional and diffusion-based baselines. By eliminating DDIM inversion and inference-stage optimization, our method achieves at least 2times faster inference than other diffusion-based approaches, making it both more effective and efficient for practical applications.

Drag-based image editing aims to modify visual content followed by user-specified drag operations. Despite existing methods having made notable progress, they still fail to fully exploit the contextual information in the reference image, including fine-grained texture details, leading to edits with limited coherence and fidelity. To address this challenge, we introduce ContextDrag, a new paradigm for drag-based editing that leverages the strong contextual modeling capability of editing models, such as FLUX-Kontext. By incorporating VAE-encoded features from the reference image, ContextDrag can leverage rich contextual cues and preserve fine-grained details, without the need for finetuning or inversion. Specifically, ContextDrag introduced a novel Context-preserving Token Injection (CTI) that injects noise-free reference features into their correct destination locations via a Latent-space Reverse Mapping (LRM) algorithm. This strategy enables precise drag control while preserving consistency in both semantics and texture details. Second, ContextDrag adopts a novel Position-Consistent Attention (PCA), which positional re-encodes the reference tokens and applies overlap-aware masking to eliminate interference from irrelevant reference features. Extensive experiments on DragBench-SR and DragBench-DR demonstrate that our approach surpasses all existing SOTA methods. Code will be publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

The diffusion model has shown exceptional capabilities in controlled image generation, which has further fueled interest in image style transfer. Existing works mainly focus on training free-based methods (e.g., image inversion) due to the scarcity of specific data. In this study, we present a data construction pipeline for content-style-stylized image triplets that generates and automatically cleanses stylized data triplets. Based on this pipeline, we construct a dataset IMAGStyle, the first large-scale style transfer dataset containing 210k image triplets, available for the community to explore and research. Equipped with IMAGStyle, we propose CSGO, a style transfer model based on end-to-end training, which explicitly decouples content and style features employing independent feature injection. The unified CSGO implements image-driven style transfer, text-driven stylized synthesis, and text editing-driven stylized synthesis. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in enhancing style control capabilities in image generation. Additional visualization and access to the source code can be located on the project page: https://csgo-gen.github.io/.

Adversarial purification with diffusion models has emerged as a promising defense strategy, but existing methods typically rely on uniform noise injection, which indiscriminately perturbs all frequencies, corrupting semantic structures and undermining robustness. Our empirical study reveals that adversarial perturbations are not uniformly distributed: they are predominantly concentrated in high-frequency regions, with heterogeneous magnitude intensity patterns that vary across frequencies and attack types. Motivated by this observation, we introduce MANI-Pure, a magnitude-adaptive purification framework that leverages the magnitude spectrum of inputs to guide the purification process. Instead of injecting homogeneous noise, MANI-Pure adaptively applies heterogeneous, frequency-targeted noise, effectively suppressing adversarial perturbations in fragile high-frequency, low-magnitude bands while preserving semantically critical low-frequency content. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-1K validate the effectiveness of MANI-Pure. It narrows the clean accuracy gap to within 0.59 of the original classifier, while boosting robust accuracy by 2.15, and achieves the top-1 robust accuracy on the RobustBench leaderboard, surpassing the previous state-of-the-art method.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Existing diffusion-based video editing models have made gorgeous advances for editing attributes of a source video over time but struggle to manipulate the motion information while preserving the original protagonist's appearance and background. To address this, we propose MotionEditor, a diffusion model for video motion editing. MotionEditor incorporates a novel content-aware motion adapter into ControlNet to capture temporal motion correspondence. While ControlNet enables direct generation based on skeleton poses, it encounters challenges when modifying the source motion in the inverted noise due to contradictory signals between the noise (source) and the condition (reference). Our adapter complements ControlNet by involving source content to transfer adapted control signals seamlessly. Further, we build up a two-branch architecture (a reconstruction branch and an editing branch) with a high-fidelity attention injection mechanism facilitating branch interaction. This mechanism enables the editing branch to query the key and value from the reconstruction branch in a decoupled manner, making the editing branch retain the original background and protagonist appearance. We also propose a skeleton alignment algorithm to address the discrepancies in pose size and position. Experiments demonstrate the promising motion editing ability of MotionEditor, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Video virtual try-on aims to replace the clothing of a person in a video with a target garment. Current dual-branch architectures have achieved significant success in diffusion models based on the U-Net; however, adapting them to diffusion models built upon the Diffusion Transformer remains challenging. Initially, introducing latent space features from the garment reference branch requires adding or modifying the backbone network, leading to a large number of trainable parameters. Subsequently, the latent space features of garments lack inherent temporal characteristics and thus require additional learning. To address these challenges, we propose a novel approach, OIE (Once is Enough), a virtual try-on strategy based on first-frame clothing replacement: specifically, we employ an image-based clothing transfer model to replace the clothing in the initial frame, and then, under the content control of the edited first frame, utilize pose and mask information to guide the temporal prior of the video generation model in synthesizing the remaining frames sequentially. Experiments show that our method achieves superior parameter efficiency and computational efficiency while still maintaining leading performance under these constraints.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly powerful but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs cause the model to deviate from its intended instructions. This paper introduces Sentinel, a novel detection model, qualifire/prompt-injection-sentinel, based on the \answerdotai/ModernBERT-large architecture. By leveraging ModernBERT's advanced features and fine-tuning on an extensive and diverse dataset comprising a few open-source and private collections, Sentinel achieves state-of-the-art performance. This dataset amalgamates varied attack types, from role-playing and instruction hijacking to attempts to generate biased content, alongside a broad spectrum of benign instructions, with private datasets specifically targeting nuanced error correction and real-world misclassifications. On a comprehensive, unseen internal test set, Sentinel demonstrates an average accuracy of 0.987 and an F1-score of 0.980. Furthermore, when evaluated on public benchmarks, it consistently outperforms strong baselines like protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2. This work details Sentinel's architecture, its meticulous dataset curation, its training methodology, and a thorough evaluation, highlighting its superior detection capabilities.

Audiovisual emotion recognition (AVER) aims to infer human emotions from nonverbal visual-audio (VA) cues, offering modality-complementary and language-agnostic advantages. However, AVER remains challenging due to the inherent ambiguity of emotional expressions, cross-modal expressive disparities, and the scarcity of reliably annotated data. Recent self-supervised AVER approaches have introduced strong multimodal representations, yet they predominantly rely on modality-specific encoders and coarse content-level alignment, limiting fine-grained emotional semantic modeling. To address these issues, we propose VAEmo, an efficient two-stage framework for emotion-centric joint VA representation learning with external knowledge injection. In Stage~1, a unified and lightweight representation network is pre-trained on large-scale speaker-centric VA corpora via masked reconstruction and contrastive objectives, mitigating the modality gap and learning expressive, complementary representations without emotion labels. In Stage~2, multimodal large language models automatically generate detailed affective descriptions according to our well-designed chain-of-thought prompting for only a small subset of VA samples; these rich textual semantics are then injected by aligning their corresponding embeddings with VA representations through dual-path contrastive learning, further bridging the emotion gap. Extensive experiments on multiple downstream AVER benchmarks show that VAEmo achieves state-of-the-art performance with a compact design, highlighting the benefit of unified cross-modal encoding and emotion-aware semantic guidance for efficient, generalizable VA emotion representations.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Style transfer, a pivotal task in image processing, synthesizes visually compelling images by seamlessly blending realistic content with artistic styles, enabling applications in photo editing and creative design. While mainstream training-free diffusion-based methods have greatly advanced style transfer in recent years, their reliance on computationally inversion processes compromises efficiency and introduces visual distortions when inversion is inaccurate. To address these limitations, we propose a novel inversion-free style transfer framework based on dual rectified flows, which tackles the challenge of finding an unknown stylized distribution from two distinct inputs (content and style images), only with forward pass. Our approach predicts content and style trajectories in parallel, then fuses them through a dynamic midpoint interpolation that integrates velocities from both paths while adapting to the evolving stylized image. By jointly modeling the content, style, and stylized distributions, our velocity field design achieves robust fusion and avoids the shortcomings of naive overlays. Attention injection further guides style integration, enhancing visual fidelity, content preservation, and computational efficiency. Extensive experiments demonstrate generalization across diverse styles and content, providing an effective and efficient pipeline for style transfer.

Zero-shot customized video generation has gained significant attention due to its substantial application potential. Existing methods rely on additional models to extract and inject reference subject features, assuming that the Video Diffusion Model (VDM) alone is insufficient for zero-shot customized video generation. However, these methods often struggle to maintain consistent subject appearance due to suboptimal feature extraction and injection techniques. In this paper, we reveal that VDM inherently possesses the force to extract and inject subject features. Departing from previous heuristic approaches, we introduce a novel framework that leverages VDM's inherent force to enable high-quality zero-shot customized video generation. Specifically, for feature extraction, we directly input reference images into VDM and use its intrinsic feature extraction process, which not only provides fine-grained features but also significantly aligns with VDM's pre-trained knowledge. For feature injection, we devise an innovative bidirectional interaction between subject features and generated content through spatial self-attention within VDM, ensuring that VDM has better subject fidelity while maintaining the diversity of the generated video.Experiments on both customized human and object video generation validate the effectiveness of our framework.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications, safeguarding them against unsafe, malicious, or privacy-violating content is critically important. We present OpenGuardrails, the first open-source project to provide both a context-aware safety and manipulation detection model and a deployable platform for comprehensive AI guardrails. OpenGuardrails protects against content-safety risks, model-manipulation attacks (e.g., prompt injection, jailbreaking, code-interpreter abuse, and the generation/execution of malicious code), and data leakage. Content-safety and model-manipulation detection are implemented by a unified large model, while data-leakage identification and redaction are performed by a separate lightweight NER pipeline (e.g., Presidio-style models or regex-based detectors). The system can be deployed as a security gateway or an API-based service, with enterprise-grade, fully private deployment options. OpenGuardrails achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on safety benchmarks, excelling in both prompt and response classification across English, Chinese, and multilingual tasks. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) must process lengthy web page observations to complete user goals; these pages often exceed tens of thousands of tokens. This saturates context limits and increases computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal action prediction. We introduce FocusAgent, a simple yet effective approach that leverages a lightweight LLM retriever to extract the most relevant lines from accessibility tree (AxTree) observations, guided by task goals. By pruning noisy and irrelevant content, FocusAgent enables efficient reasoning while reducing vulnerability to injection attacks. Experiments on WorkArena and WebArena benchmarks show that FocusAgent matches the performance of strong baselines, while reducing observation size by over 50%. Furthermore, a variant of FocusAgent significantly reduces the success rate of prompt-injection attacks, including banner and pop-up attacks, while maintaining task success performance in attack-free settings. Our results highlight that targeted LLM-based retrieval is a practical and robust strategy for building web agents that are efficient, effective, and secure.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Creating 3D assets that follow the texture and geometry style of existing ones is often desirable or even inevitable in practical applications like video gaming and virtual reality. While impressive progress has been made in generating 3D objects from text or images, creating style-controllable 3D assets remains a complex and challenging problem. In this work, we propose StyleSculptor, a novel training-free approach for generating style-guided 3D assets from a content image and one or more style images. Unlike previous works, StyleSculptor achieves style-guided 3D generation in a zero-shot manner, enabling fine-grained 3D style control that captures the texture, geometry, or both styles of user-provided style images. At the core of StyleSculptor is a novel Style Disentangled Attention (SD-Attn) module, which establishes a dynamic interaction between the input content image and style image for style-guided 3D asset generation via a cross-3D attention mechanism, enabling stable feature fusion and effective style-guided generation. To alleviate semantic content leakage, we also introduce a style-disentangled feature selection strategy within the SD-Attn module, which leverages the variance of 3D feature patches to disentangle style- and content-significant channels, allowing selective feature injection within the attention framework. With SD-Attn, the network can dynamically compute texture-, geometry-, or both-guided features to steer the 3D generation process. Built upon this, we further propose the Style Guided Control (SGC) mechanism, which enables exclusive geometry- or texture-only stylization, as well as adjustable style intensity control. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StyleSculptor outperforms existing baseline methods in producing high-fidelity 3D assets.

We present a training-free framework for style-personalized image generation that controls content and style information during inference using a scale-wise autoregressive model. Our method employs a three-path design--content, style, and generation--each guided by a corresponding text prompt, enabling flexible and efficient control over image semantics without any additional training. A central contribution of this work is a step-wise and attention-wise intervention analysis. Through systematic prompt and feature injection, we find that early-to-middle generation steps play a pivotal role in shaping both content and style, and that query features predominantly encode content-specific information. Guided by these insights, we introduce two targeted mechanisms: Key Stage Attention Sharing, which aligns content and style during the semantically critical steps, and Adaptive Query Sharing, which reinforces content semantics in later steps through similarity-aware query blending. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves competitive style fidelity and prompt fidelity compared to fine-tuned baselines, while offering faster inference and greater deployment flexibility.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

Tuning-free diffusion-based models have demonstrated significant potential in the realm of image personalization and customization. However, despite this notable progress, current models continue to grapple with several complex challenges in producing style-consistent image generation. Firstly, the concept of style is inherently underdetermined, encompassing a multitude of elements such as color, material, atmosphere, design, and structure, among others. Secondly, inversion-based methods are prone to style degradation, often resulting in the loss of fine-grained details. Lastly, adapter-based approaches frequently require meticulous weight tuning for each reference image to achieve a balance between style intensity and text controllability. In this paper, we commence by examining several compelling yet frequently overlooked observations. We then proceed to introduce InstantStyle, a framework designed to address these issues through the implementation of two key strategies: 1) A straightforward mechanism that decouples style and content from reference images within the feature space, predicated on the assumption that features within the same space can be either added to or subtracted from one another. 2) The injection of reference image features exclusively into style-specific blocks, thereby preventing style leaks and eschewing the need for cumbersome weight tuning, which often characterizes more parameter-heavy designs.Our work demonstrates superior visual stylization outcomes, striking an optimal balance between the intensity of style and the controllability of textual elements. Our codes will be available at https://github.com/InstantStyle/InstantStyle.

Text-driven video generation witnesses rapid progress. However, merely using text prompts is not enough to depict the desired subject appearance that accurately aligns with users' intents, especially for customized content creation. In this paper, we study the task of video generation with image prompts, which provide more accurate and direct content control beyond the text prompts. Specifically, we propose a feed-forward framework VideoBooth, with two dedicated designs: 1) We propose to embed image prompts in a coarse-to-fine manner. Coarse visual embeddings from image encoder provide high-level encodings of image prompts, while fine visual embeddings from the proposed attention injection module provide multi-scale and detailed encoding of image prompts. These two complementary embeddings can faithfully capture the desired appearance. 2) In the attention injection module at fine level, multi-scale image prompts are fed into different cross-frame attention layers as additional keys and values. This extra spatial information refines the details in the first frame and then it is propagated to the remaining frames, which maintains temporal consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VideoBooth achieves state-of-the-art performance in generating customized high-quality videos with subjects specified in image prompts. Notably, VideoBooth is a generalizable framework where a single model works for a wide range of image prompts with feed-forward pass.

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer for OpenClaw-based agent gateways. PRISM combines an in-process plugin with optional sidecar services and distributes enforcement across ten lifecycle hooks spanning message ingress, prompt construction, tool execution, tool-result persistence, outbound messaging, sub-agent spawning, and gateway startup. Rather than introducing a novel detection model, PRISM integrates a hybrid heuristic-plus-LLM scanning pipeline, conversation- and session-scoped risk accumulation with TTL-based decay, policy-enforced controls over tools, paths, private networks, domain tiers, and outbound secret patterns, and a tamper-evident audit and operations plane with integrity verification and hot-reloadable policy management. We outline an evaluation methodology and benchmark pipeline for measuring security effectiveness, false positives, layer contribution, runtime overhead, and operational recoverability in an agent-runtime setting, and we report current preliminary benchmark results on curated same-slice experiments and operational microbenchmarks. The system targets deployable runtime defense for real agent gateways rather than benchmark-only detection.

This paper studies the challenging task of makeup transfer, which aims to apply diverse makeup styles precisely and naturally to a given facial image. Due to the absence of paired data, current methods typically synthesize sub-optimal pseudo ground truths to guide the model training, resulting in low makeup fidelity. Additionally, different makeup styles generally have varying effects on the person face, but existing methods struggle to deal with this diversity. To address these issues, we propose a novel Self-supervised Hierarchical Makeup Transfer (SHMT) method via latent diffusion models. Following a "decoupling-and-reconstruction" paradigm, SHMT works in a self-supervised manner, freeing itself from the misguidance of imprecise pseudo-paired data. Furthermore, to accommodate a variety of makeup styles, hierarchical texture details are decomposed via a Laplacian pyramid and selectively introduced to the content representation. Finally, we design a novel Iterative Dual Alignment (IDA) module that dynamically adjusts the injection condition of the diffusion model, allowing the alignment errors caused by the domain gap between content and makeup representations to be corrected. Extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Our code is available at https://github.com/Snowfallingplum/SHMT.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Autonomous web agents such as OpenClaw are rapidly moving into high-impact real-world workflows, but their security robustness under live network threats remains insufficiently evaluated. Existing benchmarks mainly focus on static sandbox settings and content-level prompt attacks, which leaves a practical gap for network-layer security testing. In this paper, we present ClawTrap, a MITM-based red-teaming framework for real-world OpenClaw security evaluation. ClawTrap supports diverse and customizable attack forms, including Static HTML Replacement, Iframe Popup Injection, and Dynamic Content Modification, and provides a reproducible pipeline for rule-driven interception, transformation, and auditing. This design lays the foundation for future research to construct richer, customizable MITM attacks and to perform systematic security testing across agent frameworks and model backbones. Our empirical study shows clear model stratification: weaker models are more likely to trust tampered observations and produce unsafe outputs, while stronger models demonstrate better anomaly attribution and safer fallback strategies. These findings indicate that reliable OpenClaw security evaluation should explicitly incorporate dynamic real-world MITM conditions rather than relying only on static sandbox protocols.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

In this work, we propose a method to address the challenge of rendering a 3D human from a single image in a free-view manner. Some existing approaches could achieve this by using generalizable pixel-aligned implicit fields to reconstruct a textured mesh of a human or by employing a 2D diffusion model as guidance with the Score Distillation Sampling (SDS) method, to lift the 2D image into 3D space. However, a generalizable implicit field often results in an over-smooth texture field, while the SDS method tends to lead to a texture-inconsistent novel view with the input image. In this paper, we introduce a texture-consistent back view synthesis module that could transfer the reference image content to the back view through depth and text-guided attention injection. Moreover, to alleviate the color distortion that occurs in the side region, we propose a visibility-aware patch consistency regularization for texture mapping and refinement combined with the synthesized back view texture. With the above techniques, we could achieve high-fidelity and texture-consistent human rendering from a single image. Experiments conducted on both real and synthetic data demonstrate the effectiveness of our method and show that our approach outperforms previous baseline methods.

With the emergence of strong visual-language capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated tremendous potential for real-world applications. However, the security vulnerabilities exhibited by the visual modality pose significant challenges to deploying such models in open-world environments. Recent studies have successfully induced harmful responses from target MLLMs by encoding harmful textual semantics directly into visual inputs. However, in these approaches, the visual modality primarily serves as a trigger for unsafe behavior, often exhibiting semantic ambiguity and lacking grounding in realistic scenarios. In this work, we define a novel setting: visual-centric jailbreak, where visual information serves as a necessary component in constructing a complete and realistic jailbreak context. Building on this setting, we propose the VisCo (Visual Contextual) Attack. VisCo fabricates contextual dialogue using four distinct visual-focused strategies, dynamically generating auxiliary images when necessary to construct a visual-centric jailbreak scenario. To maximize attack effectiveness, it incorporates automatic toxicity obfuscation and semantic refinement to produce a final attack prompt that reliably triggers harmful responses from the target black-box MLLMs. Specifically, VisCo achieves a toxicity score of 4.78 and an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85% on MM-SafetyBench against GPT-4o, significantly outperforming the baseline, which performs a toxicity score of 2.48 and an ASR of 22.2%. The code is available at https://github.com/Dtc7w3PQ/Visco-Attack.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating code generation and software engineering tasks, yet they often struggle with complex, multi-file projects due to context limitations and knowledge gaps. We propose a novel context engineering workflow that combines multiple AI components: an Intent Translator (GPT-5) for clarifying user requirements, an Elicit-powered semantic literature retrieval for injecting domain knowledge, NotebookLM-based document synthesis for contextual understanding, and a Claude Code multi-agent system for code generation and validation. Our integrated approach leverages intent clarification, retrieval-augmented generation, and specialized sub-agents orchestrated via Claude's agent framework. We demonstrate that this method significantly improves the accuracy and reliability of code assistants in real-world repositories, yielding higher single-shot success rates and better adherence to project context than baseline single-agent approaches. Qualitative results on a large Next.js codebase show the multi-agent system effectively plans, edits, and tests complex features with minimal human intervention. We compare our system with recent frameworks like CodePlan, MASAI, and HyperAgent, highlighting how targeted context injection and agent role decomposition lead to state-of-the-art performance. Finally, we discuss the implications for deploying LLM-based coding assistants in production, along with lessons learned on context management and future research directions.

While large language models (LLMs) excel in generating coherent and contextually rich outputs, their capacity to efficiently handle long-form contexts is limited by fixed-length position embeddings. Additionally, the computational cost of processing long sequences increases quadratically, making it challenging to extend context length. To address these challenges, we propose Long-form Context Injection with Recurrent Compression (LCIRC), a method that enables the efficient processing long-form sequences beyond the model's length limit through recurrent compression without retraining the entire model. We further introduce query dependent context modeling, which selectively compresses query-relevant information, ensuring that the model retains the most pertinent content. Our empirical results demonstrate that Query Dependent LCIRC (QD-LCIRC) significantly improves LLM's ability to manage extended contexts, making it well-suited for tasks that require both comprehensive context understanding and query relevance.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained increasing prominence in artificial intelligence, making a profound impact on society and various industries like business and science. However, the presence of false information on the internet and in text corpus poses a significant risk to the reliability and safety of LLMs, underscoring the urgent need to understand the mechanisms of how false information influences the behaviors of LLMs. In this paper, we dive into this problem and investigate how false information spreads in LLMs and affects related responses. Specifically, in our series of experiments, we investigate different factors that can influence the spread of information in LLMs by comparing three degrees of information relevance (direct, indirect, and peripheral), four information source styles (Twitter, web blogs, news reports, and research papers) and two common knowledge injection paradigms (in-context injection and learning-based injection). The experimental results show that (1)False information will spread and contaminate related memories in LLMs via a semantic diffusion process, i.e., false information has global detrimental effects beyond its direct impact. (2)Current LLMs are susceptible to authority bias, i.e., LLMs are more likely to follow false information presented in trustworthy styles such as news reports and research papers, which usually cause deeper and wider pollution of information. (3)Current LLMs are more sensitive to false information through in-context injection than through learning-based injection, which severely challenges the reliability and safety of LLMs even when all training data are trusty and correct. The above findings raise the need for new false information defense algorithms to address the global impact of false information, and new alignment algorithms to unbiasedly lead LLMs to follow essential human values rather than superficial patterns.

This report presents VibeVoice-ASR, a general-purpose speech understanding framework built upon VibeVoice, designed to address the persistent challenges of context fragmentation and multi-speaker complexity in long-form audio (e.g., meetings, podcasts) that remain despite recent advancements in short-form speech recognition. Unlike traditional pipelined approaches that rely on audio chunking, VibeVoice-ASRsupports single-pass processing for up to 60 minutes of audio. It unifies Automatic Speech Recognition, Speaker Diarization, and Timestamping into a single end-to-end generation task. In addition, VibeVoice-ASR supports over 50 languages, requires no explicit language setting, and natively handles code-switching within and across utterances. Furthermore, we introduce a prompt-based context injection mechanism that allows users to supply customized conetxt, significantly improving accuracy on domain-specific terminology and polyphonic character disambiguation.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

Multi-agent LLM systems on edge devices face a memory management problem: device RAM is too small to hold every agent's KV cache simultaneously. On Apple M4 Pro with 10.2 GB of cache budget, only 3 agents fit at 8K context in FP16. A 10-agent workflow must constantly evict and reload caches. Without persistence, every eviction forces a full re-prefill through the model -- 15.7 seconds per agent at 4K context. We address this by persisting each agent's KV cache to disk in 4-bit quantized format and reloading it directly into the attention layer, eliminating redundant O(n) prefill computation via direct cache restoration. The system comprises three components: a block pool providing per-agent isolated Q4 KV caches in safetensors format, a BatchQuantizedKVCache for concurrent inference over multiple agents' quantized caches, and cross-phase context injection that accumulates attention state across conversation phases without re-computation. Evaluated on three architectures (Gemma 3 12B, dense GQA, 48 layers; DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite 16B, MoE MLA, 27 layers; Llama 3.1 8B, dense GQA, 32 layers), cache restoration reduces time-to-first-token by up to 136x (Gemma: 22--136x at 4K--32K; DeepSeek: 11--76x at 4K--32K; Llama: 24--111x at 4K--16K; 3--10x at 1K). Q4 quantization fits 4x more agent contexts into fixed device memory than FP16. Perplexity measured with actual Q4 KV caches shows -0.7% for Gemma, +2.8% for Llama, and +3.0% for DeepSeek. Open-source at https://github.com/yshk-mxim/agent-memory

Foundation models (FMs), particularly large language models (LLMs), have shown significant promise in various software engineering (SE) tasks, including code generation, debugging, and requirement refinement. Despite these advances, existing evaluation frameworks are insufficient for assessing model performance in iterative, context-rich workflows characteristic of SE activities. To address this limitation, we introduce SE Arena, an interactive platform designed to evaluate SE-focused chatbots. SE Arena provides a transparent, open-source leaderboard, supports multi-round conversational workflows, and enables end-to-end model comparisons. Moreover, SE Arena incorporates a new feature called RepoChat, which automatically injects repository-related context (e.g., issues, commits, pull requests) into the conversation, further aligning evaluations with real-world development processes. This paper outlines the design and capabilities of SE Arena, emphasizing its potential to advance the evaluation and practical application of FMs in software engineering.

Recent advances in generalist multi-agent systems (MAS) have largely followed a context-engineering plus centralized paradigm, where a planner agent coordinates multiple worker agents through unidirectional prompt passing. While effective under strong planner models, this design suffers from two critical limitations: (1) strong dependency on the planner's capability, which leads to degraded performance when a smaller LLM powers the planner; and (2) limited inter-agent communication, where collaboration relies on costly prompt concatenation and context injection, introducing redundancy and information loss. To address these challenges, we propose Anemoi, a semi-centralized MAS built on the Agent-to-Agent (A2A) communication MCP server from Coral Protocol. Unlike traditional designs, Anemoi enables structured and direct inter-agent collaboration, allowing all agents to monitor progress, assess results, identify bottlenecks, and propose refinements in real time. This paradigm reduces reliance on a single planner, supports adaptive plan updates, and minimizes redundant context passing, resulting in more scalable and cost-efficient execution. Evaluated on the GAIA benchmark, Anemoi achieved 52.73% accuracy with a small LLM (GPT-4.1-mini) as the planner, surpassing the strongest open-source baseline OWL (43.63%) by +9.09% under identical LLM settings. Our implementation is publicly available at https://github.com/Coral-Protocol/Anemoi.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been widely adopted to augment large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge for knowledge-intensive tasks. However, its effectiveness is often undermined by the presence of noisy (i.e., low-quality) retrieved passages. Enhancing LLMs' robustness to such noise is critical for improving the reliability of RAG systems. Recent advances have equipped LLMs with strong reasoning and self-reflection capabilities, allowing them to identify and correct errors in their reasoning process. Inspired by this ability, we propose Passage Injection-a simple yet effective method that explicitly incorporates retrieved passages into LLMs' reasoning process, aiming to enhance the model's ability to recognize and resist noisy passages. We validate Passage Injection under general RAG settings using BM25 as the retriever. Experiments on four reasoning-enhanced LLMs across four factual QA datasets demonstrate that Passage Injection significantly improves overall RAG performance. Further analysis on two noisy retrieval settings-random noise, where the model is provided irrelevant passages, and counterfactual noise, where it is given misleading passages-shows that Passage Injection consistently improves robustness. Controlled experiments confirm that Passage Injection can also effectively leverage helpful passages. These findings suggest that incorporating passages in LLMs' reasoning process is a promising direction for building more robust RAG systems. The code can be found here{https://github.com/mh-tang/Passage-Injection}.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Achieving character animation that meets studio-grade production standards remains challenging despite recent progress. Existing approaches can transfer motion from a driving video to a reference image, but often fail to preserve structural fidelity and temporal consistency in wild scenarios involving complex motion and cross-identity animations. In this work, we present SCAIL (Studio-grade Character Animation via In-context Learning), a framework designed to address these challenges from two key innovations. First, we propose a novel 3D pose representation, providing a more robust and flexible motion signal. Second, we introduce a full-context pose injection mechanism within a diffusion-transformer architecture, enabling effective spatio-temporal reasoning over full motion sequences. To align with studio-level requirements, we develop a curated data pipeline ensuring both diversity and quality, and establish a comprehensive benchmark for systematic evaluation. Experiments show that SCAIL achieves state-of-the-art performance and advances character animation toward studio-grade reliability and realism.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

The integration of Rotary Position Embedding (RoPE) in Multimodal Diffusion Transformer (MMDiT) has significantly enhanced text-to-image generation quality. However, the fundamental reliance of self-attention layers on positional embedding versus query-key similarity during generation remains an intriguing question. We present the first mechanistic analysis of RoPE-based MMDiT models (e.g., FLUX), introducing an automated probing strategy that disentangles positional information versus content dependencies by strategically manipulating RoPE during generation. Our analysis reveals distinct dependency patterns that do not straightforwardly correlate with depth, offering new insights into the layer-specific roles in RoPE-based MMDiT. Based on these findings, we propose a training-free, task-specific image editing framework that categorizes editing tasks into three types: position-dependent editing (e.g., object addition), content similarity-dependent editing (e.g., non-rigid editing), and region-preserved editing (e.g., background replacement). For each type, we design tailored key-value injection strategies based on the characteristics of the editing task. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, particularly in preserving original semantic content and achieving seamless modifications.

While text-to-image synthesis currently enjoys great popularity among researchers and the general public, the security of these models has been neglected so far. Many text-guided image generation models rely on pre-trained text encoders from external sources, and their users trust that the retrieved models will behave as promised. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. We introduce backdoor attacks against text-guided generative models and demonstrate that their text encoders pose a major tampering risk. Our attacks only slightly alter an encoder so that no suspicious model behavior is apparent for image generations with clean prompts. By then inserting a single character trigger into the prompt, e.g., a non-Latin character or emoji, the adversary can trigger the model to either generate images with pre-defined attributes or images following a hidden, potentially malicious description. We empirically demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attacks on Stable Diffusion and highlight that the injection process of a single backdoor takes less than two minutes. Besides phrasing our approach solely as an attack, it can also force an encoder to forget phrases related to certain concepts, such as nudity or violence, and help to make image generation safer.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

Dense retrieval systems have been widely used in various NLP applications. However, their vulnerabilities to potential attacks have been underexplored. This paper investigates a novel attack scenario where the attackers aim to mislead the retrieval system into retrieving the attacker-specified contents. Those contents, injected into the retrieval corpus by attackers, can include harmful text like hate speech or spam. Unlike prior methods that rely on model weights and generate conspicuous, unnatural outputs, we propose a covert backdoor attack triggered by grammar errors. Our approach ensures that the attacked models can function normally for standard queries while covertly triggering the retrieval of the attacker's contents in response to minor linguistic mistakes. Specifically, dense retrievers are trained with contrastive loss and hard negative sampling. Surprisingly, our findings demonstrate that contrastive loss is notably sensitive to grammatical errors, and hard negative sampling can exacerbate susceptibility to backdoor attacks. Our proposed method achieves a high attack success rate with a minimal corpus poisoning rate of only 0.048\%, while preserving normal retrieval performance. This indicates that the method has negligible impact on user experience for error-free queries. Furthermore, evaluations across three real-world defense strategies reveal that the malicious passages embedded within the corpus remain highly resistant to detection and filtering, underscoring the robustness and subtlety of the proposed attack Codes of this work are available at https://github.com/ruyue0001/Backdoor_DPR..

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

We present Magic Insert, a method for dragging-and-dropping subjects from a user-provided image into a target image of a different style in a physically plausible manner while matching the style of the target image. This work formalizes the problem of style-aware drag-and-drop and presents a method for tackling it by addressing two sub-problems: style-aware personalization and realistic object insertion in stylized images. For style-aware personalization, our method first fine-tunes a pretrained text-to-image diffusion model using LoRA and learned text tokens on the subject image, and then infuses it with a CLIP representation of the target style. For object insertion, we use Bootstrapped Domain Adaption to adapt a domain-specific photorealistic object insertion model to the domain of diverse artistic styles. Overall, the method significantly outperforms traditional approaches such as inpainting. Finally, we present a dataset, SubjectPlop, to facilitate evaluation and future progress in this area. Project page: https://magicinsert.github.io/

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

On the world wide web, toxic content detectors are a crucial line of defense against potentially hateful and offensive messages. As such, building highly effective classifiers that enable a safer internet is an important research area. Moreover, the web is a highly multilingual, cross-cultural community that develops its own lingo over time. As such, it is crucial to develop models that are effective across a diverse range of languages, usages, and styles. In this paper, we present the fundamentals behind the next version of the Perspective API from Google Jigsaw. At the heart of the approach is a single multilingual token-free Charformer model that is applicable across a range of languages, domains, and tasks. We demonstrate that by forgoing static vocabularies, we gain flexibility across a variety of settings. We additionally outline the techniques employed to make such a byte-level model efficient and feasible for productionization. Through extensive experiments on multilingual toxic comment classification benchmarks derived from real API traffic and evaluation on an array of code-switching, covert toxicity, emoji-based hate, human-readable obfuscation, distribution shift, and bias evaluation settings, we show that our proposed approach outperforms strong baselines. Finally, we present our findings from deploying this system in production.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) techniques have emerged as a promising solution to enhance the reliability of large language models (LLMs) by addressing issues like hallucinations, outdated knowledge, and domain adaptation. In particular, existing RAG methods append relevant documents retrieved from external corpus or databases to the input of LLMs to guide their generation process, which we refer to as the in-context knowledge injection method. While this approach is simple and often effective, it has inherent limitations. Firstly, increasing the context length and number of relevant documents can lead to higher computational overhead and degraded performance, especially in complex reasoning tasks. More importantly, in-context knowledge injection operates primarily at the input level, but LLMs store their internal knowledge in their parameters. This gap fundamentally limits the capacity of in-context methods. To this end, we introduce Parametric retrieval-augmented generation (Parametric RAG), a new RAG paradigm that integrates external knowledge directly into the parameters of feed-forward networks (FFN) of an LLM through document parameterization. This approach not only saves online computational costs by eliminating the need to inject multiple documents into the LLMs' input context, but also deepens the integration of external knowledge into the parametric knowledge space of the LLM. Experimental results demonstrate that Parametric RAG substantially enhances both the effectiveness and efficiency of knowledge augmentation in LLMs. Also, it can be combined with in-context RAG methods to achieve even better performance. We have open-sourced all the code, data, and models in the following anonymized GitHub link: https://github.com/oneal2000/PRAG

Diffusion models have become a powerful backbone for text-to-image generation, producing high-quality visuals from natural language prompts. However, when prompts involve multiple objects alongside global or local style instructions, the outputs often drift in style and lose spatial coherence, limiting their reliability for controlled, style-consistent scene generation. We present Local Prompt Adaptation (LPA), a lightweight, training-free method that splits the prompt into content and style tokens, then injects them selectively into the U-Net's attention layers at chosen timesteps. By conditioning object tokens early and style tokens later in the denoising process, LPA improves both layout control and stylistic uniformity without additional training cost. We conduct extensive ablations across parser settings and injection windows, finding that the best configuration -- lpa late only with a 300-650 step window -- delivers the strongest balance of prompt alignment and style consistency. On the T2I benchmark, LPA improves CLIP-prompt alignment over vanilla SDXL by +0.41% and over SD1.5 by +0.34%, with no diversity loss. On our custom 50-prompt style-rich benchmark, LPA achieves +0.09% CLIP-prompt and +0.08% CLIP-style gains over baseline. Our method is model-agnostic, easy to integrate, and requires only a single configuration change, making it a practical choice for controllable, style-consistent multi-object generation.

With the ability to generate high-quality images, text-to-image (T2I) models can be exploited for creating inappropriate content. To prevent misuse, existing safety measures are either based on text blacklists, which can be easily circumvented, or harmful content classification, requiring large datasets for training and offering low flexibility. Hence, we propose Latent Guard, a framework designed to improve safety measures in text-to-image generation. Inspired by blacklist-based approaches, Latent Guard learns a latent space on top of the T2I model's text encoder, where it is possible to check the presence of harmful concepts in the input text embeddings. Our proposed framework is composed of a data generation pipeline specific to the task using large language models, ad-hoc architectural components, and a contrastive learning strategy to benefit from the generated data. The effectiveness of our method is verified on three datasets and against four baselines. Code and data will be shared at https://latentguard.github.io/.

State-of-the-art Diffusion Models (DMs) produce highly realistic images. While prior work has successfully mitigated Not Safe For Work (NSFW) content in the visual domain, we identify a novel threat: the generation of NSFW text embedded within images. This includes offensive language, such as insults, racial slurs, and sexually explicit terms, posing significant risks to users. We show that all state-of-the-art DMs (e.g., SD3, SDXL, Flux, DeepFloyd IF) are vulnerable to this issue. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that existing mitigation techniques, effective for visual content, fail to prevent harmful text generation while substantially degrading benign text generation. As an initial step toward addressing this threat, we introduce a novel fine-tuning strategy that targets only the text-generation layers in DMs. Therefore, we construct a safety fine-tuning dataset by pairing each NSFW prompt with two images: one with the NSFW term, and another where that term is replaced with a carefully crafted benign alternative while leaving the image unchanged otherwise. By training on this dataset, the model learns to avoid generating harmful text while preserving benign content and overall image quality. Finally, to advance research in the area, we release ToxicBench, an open-source benchmark for evaluating NSFW text generation in images. It includes our curated fine-tuning dataset, a set of harmful prompts, new evaluation metrics, and a pipeline that assesses both NSFW-ness and text and image quality. Our benchmark aims to guide future efforts in mitigating NSFW text generation in text-to-image models, thereby contributing to their safe deployment. The benchmark is available online for download.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

Recent progress in text-to-image (T2I) models enables high-quality image generation with flexible textual control. To utilize the abundant visual priors in the off-the-shelf T2I models, a series of methods try to invert an image to proper embedding that aligns with the semantic space of the T2I model. However, these image-to-text (I2T) inversion methods typically need multiple source images containing the same concept or struggle with the imbalance between editing flexibility and visual fidelity. In this work, we point out that the critical problem lies in the foreground-background entanglement when learning an intended concept, and propose a simple and effective baseline for single-image I2T inversion, named SingleInsert. SingleInsert adopts a two-stage scheme. In the first stage, we regulate the learned embedding to concentrate on the foreground area without being associated with the irrelevant background. In the second stage, we finetune the T2I model for better visual resemblance and devise a semantic loss to prevent the language drift problem. With the proposed techniques, SingleInsert excels in single concept generation with high visual fidelity while allowing flexible editing. Additionally, SingleInsert can perform single-image novel view synthesis and multiple concepts composition without requiring joint training. To facilitate evaluation, we design an editing prompt list and introduce a metric named Editing Success Rate (ESR) for quantitative assessment of editing flexibility. Our project page is: https://jarrentwu1031.github.io/SingleInsert-web/

Recent advances in diffusion models have enhanced multimodal-guided visual generation, enabling customized subject insertion that seamlessly "brushes" user-specified objects into a given image guided by textual prompts. However, existing methods often struggle to insert customized subjects with high fidelity and align results with the user's intent through textual prompts. In this work, we propose "In-Context Brush", a zero-shot framework for customized subject insertion by reformulating the task within the paradigm of in-context learning. Without loss of generality, we formulate the object image and the textual prompts as cross-modal demonstrations, and the target image with the masked region as the query. The goal is to inpaint the target image with the subject aligning textual prompts without model tuning. Building upon a pretrained MMDiT-based inpainting network, we perform test-time enhancement via dual-level latent space manipulation: intra-head "latent feature shifting" within each attention head that dynamically shifts attention outputs to reflect the desired subject semantics and inter-head "attention reweighting" across different heads that amplifies prompt controllability through differential attention prioritization. Extensive experiments and applications demonstrate that our approach achieves superior identity preservation, text alignment, and image quality compared to existing state-of-the-art methods, without requiring dedicated training or additional data collection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have revolutionized the creation of generalist web agents, empowering them to autonomously complete diverse tasks on real-world websites, thereby boosting human efficiency and productivity. However, despite their remarkable capabilities, the safety and security of these agents against malicious attacks remain critically underexplored, raising significant concerns about their safe deployment. To uncover and exploit such vulnerabilities in web agents, we provide AdvWeb, a novel black-box attack framework designed against web agents. AdvWeb trains an adversarial prompter model that generates and injects adversarial prompts into web pages, misleading web agents into executing targeted adversarial actions such as inappropriate stock purchases or incorrect bank transactions, actions that could lead to severe real-world consequences. With only black-box access to the web agent, we train and optimize the adversarial prompter model using DPO, leveraging both successful and failed attack strings against the target agent. Unlike prior approaches, our adversarial string injection maintains stealth and control: (1) the appearance of the website remains unchanged before and after the attack, making it nearly impossible for users to detect tampering, and (2) attackers can modify specific substrings within the generated adversarial string to seamlessly change the attack objective (e.g., purchasing stocks from a different company), enhancing attack flexibility and efficiency. We conduct extensive evaluations, demonstrating that AdvWeb achieves high success rates in attacking SOTA GPT-4V-based VLM agent across various web tasks. Our findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current LLM/VLM-based agents, emphasizing the urgent need for developing more reliable web agents and effective defenses. Our code and data are available at https://ai-secure.github.io/AdvWeb/ .

Text-guided non-rigid editing involves complex edits for input images, such as changing motion or compositions within their surroundings. Since it requires manipulating the input structure, existing methods often struggle with preserving object identity and background, particularly when combined with Stable Diffusion. In this work, we propose a training-free approach for non-rigid editing with Stable Diffusion, aimed at improving the identity preservation quality without compromising editability. Our approach comprises three stages: text optimization, latent inversion, and timestep-aware text injection sampling. Inspired by the recent success of Imagic, we employ their text optimization for smooth editing. Then, we introduce latent inversion to preserve the input image's identity without additional model fine-tuning. To fully utilize the input reconstruction ability of latent inversion, we suggest timestep-aware text inject sampling. This effectively retains the structure of the input image by injecting the source text prompt in early sampling steps and then transitioning to the target prompt in subsequent sampling steps. This strategic approach seamlessly harmonizes with text optimization, facilitating complex non-rigid edits to the input without losing the original identity. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in terms of identity preservation, editability, and aesthetic quality through extensive experiments.

Text-to-image based object customization, aiming to generate images with the same identity (ID) as objects of interest in accordance with text prompts and reference images, has made significant progress. However, recent customizing research is dominated by specialized tasks, such as human customization or virtual try-on, leaving a gap in general object customization. To this end, we introduce AnyMaker, an innovative zero-shot object customization framework capable of generating general objects with high ID fidelity and flexible text editability. The efficacy of AnyMaker stems from its novel general ID extraction, dual-level ID injection, and ID-aware decoupling. Specifically, the general ID extraction module extracts sufficient ID information with an ensemble of self-supervised models to tackle the diverse customization tasks for general objects. Then, to provide the diffusion UNet with the extracted ID as much while not damaging the text editability in the generation process, we design a global-local dual-level ID injection module, in which the global-level semantic ID is injected into text descriptions while the local-level ID details are injected directly into the model through newly added cross-attention modules. In addition, we propose an ID-aware decoupling module to disentangle ID-related information from non-ID elements in the extracted representations for high-fidelity generation of both identity and text descriptions. To validate our approach and boost the research of general object customization, we create the first large-scale general ID dataset, Multi-Category ID-Consistent (MC-IDC) dataset, with 315k text-image samples and 10k categories. Experiments show that AnyMaker presents remarkable performance in general object customization and outperforms specialized methods in corresponding tasks. Code and dataset will be released soon.

We introduce ObjectAdd, a training-free diffusion modification method to add user-expected objects into user-specified area. The motive of ObjectAdd stems from: first, describing everything in one prompt can be difficult, and second, users often need to add objects into the generated image. To accommodate with real world, our ObjectAdd maintains accurate image consistency after adding objects with technical innovations in: (1) embedding-level concatenation to ensure correct text embedding coalesce; (2) object-driven layout control with latent and attention injection to ensure objects accessing user-specified area; (3) prompted image inpainting in an attention refocusing & object expansion fashion to ensure rest of the image stays the same. With a text-prompted image, our ObjectAdd allows users to specify a box and an object, and achieves: (1) adding object inside the box area; (2) exact content outside the box area; (3) flawless fusion between the two areas

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

Large-scale pre-trained diffusion models empower users to edit images through text guidance. However, existing methods often over-align with target prompts while inadequately preserving source image semantics. Such approaches generate target images explicitly or implicitly from the inversion noise of the source images, termed the inversion anchors. We identify this strategy as suboptimal for semantic preservation and inefficient due to elongated editing paths. We propose TweezeEdit, a tuning- and inversion-free framework for consistent and efficient image editing. Our method addresses these limitations by regularizing the entire denoising path rather than relying solely on the inversion anchors, ensuring source semantic retention and shortening editing paths. Guided by gradient-driven regularization, we efficiently inject target prompt semantics along a direct path using a consistency model. Extensive experiments demonstrate TweezeEdit's superior performance in semantic preservation and target alignment, outperforming existing methods. Remarkably, it requires only 12 steps (1.6 seconds per edit), underscoring its potential for real-time applications.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Despite their impressive capabilities, current Text-to-Image (T2I) models remain prone to generating unsafe and toxic content. While activation steering offers a promising inference-time intervention, we observe that linear activation steering frequently degrades image quality when applied to benign prompts. To address this trade-off, we first construct SafeSteerDataset, a contrastive dataset containing 2300 safe and unsafe prompt pairs with high cosine similarity. Leveraging this data, we propose Conditioned Activation Transport (CAT), a framework that employs a geometry-based conditioning mechanism and nonlinear transport maps. By conditioning transport maps to activate only within unsafe activation regions, we minimize interference with benign queries. We validate our approach on two state-of-the-art architectures: Z-Image and Infinity. Experiments demonstrate that CAT generalizes effectively across these backbones, significantly reducing Attack Success Rate while maintaining image fidelity compared to unsteered generations. Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive text and images.

Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) provide a powerful foundation for natural language tasks in large-scale customer-facing applications. However, studies that explore their vulnerabilities emerging from malicious user interaction are scarce. By proposing PromptInject, a prosaic alignment framework for mask-based iterative adversarial prompt composition, we examine how GPT-3, the most widely deployed language model in production, can be easily misaligned by simple handcrafted inputs. In particular, we investigate two types of attacks -- goal hijacking and prompt leaking -- and demonstrate that even low-aptitude, but sufficiently ill-intentioned agents, can easily exploit GPT-3's stochastic nature, creating long-tail risks. The code for PromptInject is available at https://github.com/agencyenterprise/PromptInject.

Text-to-video (T2V) generative models have rapidly advanced and found widespread applications across fields like entertainment, education, and marketing. However, the adversarial vulnerabilities of these models remain rarely explored. We observe that in T2V generation tasks, the generated videos often contain substantial redundant information not explicitly specified in the text prompts, such as environmental elements, secondary objects, and additional details, providing opportunities for malicious attackers to embed hidden harmful content. Exploiting this inherent redundancy, we introduce BadVideo, the first backdoor attack framework tailored for T2V generation. Our attack focuses on designing target adversarial outputs through two key strategies: (1) Spatio-Temporal Composition, which combines different spatiotemporal features to encode malicious information; (2) Dynamic Element Transformation, which introduces transformations in redundant elements over time to convey malicious information. Based on these strategies, the attacker's malicious target seamlessly integrates with the user's textual instructions, providing high stealthiness. Moreover, by exploiting the temporal dimension of videos, our attack successfully evades traditional content moderation systems that primarily analyze spatial information within individual frames. Extensive experiments demonstrate that BadVideo achieves high attack success rates while preserving original semantics and maintaining excellent performance on clean inputs. Overall, our work reveals the adversarial vulnerability of T2V models, calling attention to potential risks and misuse. Our project page is at https://wrt2000.github.io/BadVideo2025/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

Text-driven image editing enables users to flexibly modify visual content through natural language instructions, and is widely applied to tasks such as semantic object replacement, insertion, and removal. While recent inversion-based editing methods using rectified flow models have achieved promising results in image quality, we identify a structural limitation in their editing behavior: the semantic bias toward the source concept encoded in the inverted noise tends to suppress attention to the target concept. This issue becomes particularly critical when the source and target semantics are dissimilar, where the attention mechanism inherently leads to editing failure or unintended modifications in non-target regions. In this paper, we systematically analyze and validate this structural flaw, and introduce LORE, a training-free and efficient image editing method. LORE directly optimizes the inverted noise, addressing the core limitations in generalization and controllability of existing approaches, enabling stable, controllable, and general-purpose concept replacement, without requiring architectural modification or model fine-tuning. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on three challenging benchmarks: PIEBench, SmartEdit, and GapEdit. Experimental results show that LORE significantly outperforms strong baselines in terms of semantic alignment, image quality, and background fidelity, demonstrating the effectiveness and scalability of latent-space optimization for general-purpose image editing.

Since the proliferation of LLMs, there have been concerns about their misuse for harmful content creation and spreading. Recent studies justify such fears, providing evidence of LLM vulnerabilities and high potential of their misuse. Humans are no longer able to distinguish between high-quality machine-generated and authentic human-written texts. Therefore, it is crucial to develop automated means to accurately detect machine-generated content. It would enable to identify such content in online information space, thus providing an additional information about its credibility. This work addresses the problem by proposing a robust fine-tuning process of LLMs for the detection task, making the detectors more robust against obfuscation and more generalizable to out-of-distribution data.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

The ability to fine-tune generative models for text-to-image generation tasks is crucial, particularly facing the complexity involved in accurately interpreting and visualizing textual inputs. While LoRA is efficient for language model adaptation, it often falls short in text-to-image tasks due to the intricate demands of image generation, such as accommodating a broad spectrum of styles and nuances. To bridge this gap, we introduce StyleInject, a specialized fine-tuning approach tailored for text-to-image models. StyleInject comprises multiple parallel low-rank parameter matrices, maintaining the diversity of visual features. It dynamically adapts to varying styles by adjusting the variance of visual features based on the characteristics of the input signal. This approach significantly minimizes the impact on the original model's text-image alignment capabilities while adeptly adapting to various styles in transfer learning. StyleInject proves particularly effective in learning from and enhancing a range of advanced, community-fine-tuned generative models. Our comprehensive experiments, including both small-sample and large-scale data fine-tuning as well as base model distillation, show that StyleInject surpasses traditional LoRA in both text-image semantic consistency and human preference evaluation, all while ensuring greater parameter efficiency.

This study systematically analyzes the vulnerability of 36 large language models (LLMs) to various prompt injection attacks, a technique that leverages carefully crafted prompts to elicit malicious LLM behavior. Across 144 prompt injection tests, we observed a strong correlation between model parameters and vulnerability, with statistical analyses, such as logistic regression and random forest feature analysis, indicating that parameter size and architecture significantly influence susceptibility. Results revealed that 56 percent of tests led to successful prompt injections, emphasizing widespread vulnerability across various parameter sizes, with clustering analysis identifying distinct vulnerability profiles associated with specific model configurations. Additionally, our analysis uncovered correlations between certain prompt injection techniques, suggesting potential overlaps in vulnerabilities. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust, multi-layered defenses in LLMs deployed across critical infrastructure and sensitive industries. Successful prompt injection attacks could result in severe consequences, including data breaches, unauthorized access, or misinformation. Future research should explore multilingual and multi-step defenses alongside adaptive mitigation strategies to strengthen LLM security in diverse, real-world environments.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has significantly enhanced the factual accuracy and domain adaptability of Large Language Models (LLMs). This advancement has enabled their widespread deployment across sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and enterprise applications. RAG mitigates hallucinations by integrating external knowledge, yet introduces privacy risk and security risk, notably data breaching risk and data poisoning risk. While recent studies have explored prompt injection and poisoning attacks, there remains a significant gap in comprehensive research on controlling inbound and outbound query flows to mitigate these threats. In this paper, we propose an AI firewall, ControlNET, designed to safeguard RAG-based LLM systems from these vulnerabilities. ControlNET controls query flows by leveraging activation shift phenomena to detect adversarial queries and mitigate their impact through semantic divergence. We conduct comprehensive experiments on four different benchmark datasets including Msmarco, HotpotQA, FinQA, and MedicalSys using state-of-the-art open source LLMs (Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral). Our results demonstrate that ControlNET achieves over 0.909 AUROC in detecting and mitigating security threats while preserving system harmlessness. Overall, ControlNET offers an effective, robust, harmless defense mechanism, marking a significant advancement toward the secure deployment of RAG-based LLM systems.

Content moderation is the process of screening and monitoring user-generated content online. It plays a crucial role in stopping content resulting from unacceptable behaviors such as hate speech, harassment, violence against specific groups, terrorism, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, or misogyny, to mention some few, in Online Social Platforms. These platforms make use of a plethora of tools to detect and manage malicious information; however, malicious actors also improve their skills, developing strategies to surpass these barriers and continuing to spread misleading information. Twisting and camouflaging keywords are among the most used techniques to evade platform content moderation systems. In response to this recent ongoing issue, this paper presents an innovative approach to address this linguistic trend in social networks through the simulation of different content evasion techniques and a multilingual Transformer model for content evasion detection. In this way, we share with the rest of the scientific community a multilingual public tool, named "pyleetspeak" to generate/simulate in a customizable way the phenomenon of content evasion through automatic word camouflage and a multilingual Named-Entity Recognition (NER) Transformer-based model tuned for its recognition and detection. The multilingual NER model is evaluated in different textual scenarios, detecting different types and mixtures of camouflage techniques, achieving an overall weighted F1 score of 0.8795. This article contributes significantly to countering malicious information by developing multilingual tools to simulate and detect new methods of evasion of content on social networks, making the fight against information disorders more effective.

Reference-based object composition methods fail when inserting real-world objects into stylized domains. This under-explored problem is currently split between practical "blenders" that lack generative fidelity and "generators" that require impractical, per-subject online finetuning. In this work, we introduce Insert In Style, the first zero-shot generative framework that is both practical and high-fidelity. Our core contribution is a unified framework with two key innovations: (i) a novel multi-stage training protocol that disentangles representations for identity, style, and composition, and (ii) a specialized masked-attention architecture that surgically enforces this disentanglement during generation. This approach prevents the concept interference common in general-purpose, unified-attention models. Our framework is trained on a new 100k sample dataset, curated from a novel data pipeline. This pipeline couples large-scale generation with a rigorous, two-stage filtering process to ensure both high-fidelity semantic identity and style coherence. Unlike prior work, our model is truly zero-shot and requires no text prompts. We also introduce a new public benchmark for stylized composition. We demonstrate state-of-the-art performance, significantly outperforming existing methods on both identity and style metrics, a result strongly corroborated by user studies.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have shown surprising performance in generating high-quality images. However, concerns have arisen regarding the unauthorized data usage during the training or fine-tuning process. One example is when a model trainer collects a set of images created by a particular artist and attempts to train a model capable of generating similar images without obtaining permission and giving credit to the artist. To address this issue, we propose a method for detecting such unauthorized data usage by planting the injected memorization into the text-to-image diffusion models trained on the protected dataset. Specifically, we modify the protected images by adding unique contents on these images using stealthy image warping functions that are nearly imperceptible to humans but can be captured and memorized by diffusion models. By analyzing whether the model has memorized the injected content (i.e., whether the generated images are processed by the injected post-processing function), we can detect models that had illegally utilized the unauthorized data. Experiments on Stable Diffusion and VQ Diffusion with different model training or fine-tuning methods (i.e, LoRA, DreamBooth, and standard training) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in detecting unauthorized data usages. Code: https://github.com/ZhentingWang/DIAGNOSIS.

Instruction-based image editing aims to modify specific content within existing images according to user-provided instructions while preserving non-target regions. Beyond traditional object- and style-centric manipulation, text-centric image editing focuses on modifying, translating, or rearranging textual elements embedded within images. However, existing leading models often struggle to execute complex text editing precisely, frequently producing blurry or hallucinated characters. We attribute these failures primarily to the lack of specialized training paradigms tailored for text-centric editing, as well as the absence of large-scale datasets and standardized benchmarks necessary for a closed-loop training and evaluation system. To address these limitations, we present WeEdit, a systematic solution encompassing a scalable data construction pipeline, two benchmarks, and a tailored two-stage training strategy. Specifically, we propose a novel HTML-based automatic editing pipeline, which generates 330K training pairs covering diverse editing operations and 15 languages, accompanied by standardized bilingual and multilingual benchmarks for comprehensive evaluation. On the algorithmic side, we employ glyph-guided supervised fine-tuning to inject explicit spatial and content priors, followed by a multi-objective reinforcement learning stage to align generation with instruction adherence, text clarity, and background preservation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that WeEdit outperforms previous open-source models by a clear margin across diverse editing operations.

From the perspective of content safety issues, alignment has shown to limit large language models' (LLMs) harmful content generation. This intentional method of reinforcing models to not respond to certain user inputs seem to be present in many modern open-source instruction tuning datasets such as OpenAssistant or Guanaco. We introduce a novel insight to an instruction-tuned model's performance affected by the presence of alignment in supervised fine-tuning dataset. To be specific, we noticed that alignment acts as if it is poisoning the instruction dataset. Experimentally, we demonstrate that aligned answers significantly worsen the performance of the resulting fine-tuned model's on various reasoning benchmarks such as Big Bench (BBH), Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU), Human Eval, and Discrete Reasoning Over Paragraphs (DROP), performing worse than the counterpart tuned without alignment by 4-33%.

Text-to-image (T2I) models, such as Stable Diffusion, have exhibited remarkable performance in generating high-quality images from text descriptions in recent years. However, text-to-image models may be tricked into generating not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, particularly in sexual scenarios. Existing countermeasures mostly focus on filtering inappropriate inputs and outputs, or suppressing improper text embeddings, which can block explicit NSFW-related content (e.g., naked or sexy) but may still be vulnerable to adversarial prompts inputs that appear innocent but are ill-intended. In this paper, we present SafeGen, a framework to mitigate unsafe content generation by text-to-image models in a text-agnostic manner. The key idea is to eliminate unsafe visual representations from the model regardless of the text input. In this way, the text-to-image model is resistant to adversarial prompts since unsafe visual representations are obstructed from within. Extensive experiments conducted on four datasets demonstrate SafeGen's effectiveness in mitigating unsafe content generation while preserving the high-fidelity of benign images. SafeGen outperforms eight state-of-the-art baseline methods and achieves 99.1% sexual content removal performance. Furthermore, our constructed benchmark of adversarial prompts provides a basis for future development and evaluation of anti-NSFW-generation methods.

Ensuring the safe alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is critical as they become integral to applications like translation and question answering. Current alignment methods struggle with dynamic user intentions and complex objectives, making models vulnerable to generating harmful content. We propose Safety Arithmetic, a training-free framework enhancing LLM safety across different scenarios: Base models, Supervised fine-tuned models (SFT), and Edited models. Safety Arithmetic involves Harm Direction Removal to avoid harmful content and Safety Alignment to promote safe responses. Additionally, we present NoIntentEdit, a dataset highlighting edit instances that could compromise model safety if used unintentionally. Our experiments show that Safety Arithmetic significantly improves safety measures, reduces over-safety, and maintains model utility, outperforming existing methods in ensuring safe content generation.

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose AgentWatcher to address the above two limitations. To address the first limitation, AgentWatcher attributes the LLM's output (e.g., the action of an agent) to a small set of causally influential context segments. By focusing detection on a relatively short text, AgentWatcher can be scalable to long contexts. To address the second limitation, we define a set of rules specifying what does and does not constitute a prompt injection, and use a monitor LLM to reason over these rules based on the attributed text, making the detection decisions more explainable. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on tool-use agent benchmarks and long-context understanding datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that AgentWatcher can effectively detect prompt injection and maintain utility without attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/wang-yanting/AgentWatcher.

In this paper, we focus on the task of instruction-based image editing. Previous works like InstructPix2Pix, InstructDiffusion, and SmartEdit have explored end-to-end editing. However, two limitations still remain: First, existing datasets suffer from low resolution, poor background consistency, and overly simplistic instructions. Second, current approaches mainly condition on the text while the rich image information is underexplored, therefore inferior in complex instruction following and maintaining background consistency. Targeting these issues, we first curated the AdvancedEdit dataset using a novel data construction pipeline, formulating a large-scale dataset with high visual quality, complex instructions, and good background consistency. Then, to further inject the rich image information, we introduce a two-stream bridging mechanism utilizing both the textual and visual features reasoned by the powerful Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLM) to guide the image editing process more precisely. Extensive results demonstrate that our approach, InsightEdit, achieves state-of-the-art performance, excelling in complex instruction following and maintaining high background consistency with the original image.

Subject-driven generation is a critical task in creative AI; yet current state-of-the-art methods present a stark trade-off. They either rely on computationally expensive, per-subject fine-tuning, sacrificing efficiency and zero-shot capability, or employ feed-forward architectures built on diffusion models, which are inherently plagued by slow inference speeds. Visual Auto-Regressive (VAR) models are renowned for their rapid sampling speeds and strong generative quality, making them an ideal yet underexplored foundation for resolving this tension. To bridge this gap, we introduce EchoGen, a pioneering framework that empowers VAR models with subject-driven generation capabilities. The core design of EchoGen is an effective dual-path injection strategy that disentangles a subject's high-level semantic identity from its low-level fine-grained details, enabling enhanced controllability and fidelity. We employ a semantic encoder to extract the subject's abstract identity, which is injected through decoupled cross-attention to guide the overall composition. Concurrently, a content encoder captures intricate visual details, which are integrated via a multi-modal attention mechanism to ensure high-fidelity texture and structural preservation. To the best of our knowledge, EchoGen is the first feed-forward subject-driven framework built upon VAR models. Both quantitative and qualitative results substantiate our design, demonstrating that EchoGen achieves subject fidelity and image quality comparable to state-of-the-art diffusion-based methods with significantly lower sampling latency. Code and models will be released soon.